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IV

I:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of an Industrial Commission affirmation of a Department of Labor
redetermination that "employee" long-haul truckers were wrongly regarded as independent
contractors.
B. Course of Proceedings Below
A redetermination and billing for unemployment taxes and penalties owed was issued to
Western Home Transport, Inc. (hereinafter "Western") in September, 2011. An appeal was
timely filed. A Hearing Officer Paul Kime took evidence on May 16, 2012. On the basis of the
record and the precedent in Giltner v. Idaho Department of Commerce, 145 Idaho 415, 179 P3d
1071 (2008), the field finding was sustained. Thereafter, on a further appeal, the Industrial
Commission, without taking additional evidence or argument, also ruled against Western on
October 2, 2012. The Appellant now seeks judicial review of those final holdings on the record
developed below, per the arguments presented herein.
C. Statement of Facts
Western Home Transport, Inc. is a Boise based long-haul arranger which services the
manufactured housing industry in the Treasure Valley. It accepts the consignment of oversized
mobile home structures built by local factories and causes them to be delivered to consigneepurchasers throughout the U.S. and Canada. It has five to seven salaried office employees upon
whom it pays unemployment insurance. It does not employ any drivers and does not own any
truck tractors.
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Instead, it utilizes a "Western-Independent Contractor Term Sheet" (Hearing Exhibit "D",
hereinafter ("Ex-D") to engage a professional and duly licensed trucker who owns and maintains
his O\Vn rig for hire. Using its "Western Standard Lease Form", ("Ex-E") the trucker's tractor is
leased for use in the hauls. Western has operated in this fashion without challenge, issuing Form
1099's to the truckers for their self-filing for federal and state income tax purposes since 1996.
None of Western's independent contract drivers has ever complained about this arrangement or
applied for unemployment insurance. Instead, in 2011 Western was "selected to have an audit
done" by the Idaho Department of Labor. (Transcript of Hearing held May 16, 2012) page 12,
line 4, hereinafter (T 12, 4)
At hearing, truck owner Darrel Robeson, one of Western's contractors, testified that he:
a. owned his freightliner truck
b. owned tools for the truck
c. garaged the truck
d. serviced the truck or did his own repairs
e. Had his own CDL license, and social security card
f. took mandated drug tests and medical exams at his own cost

g. regarded himself as an independent contractor, in fact and per his contract with
Western
h. had the authority to accept or reject an offered trip, to work or not work, when
Western contacted him with an offer
i.

set his own work start and stop times and vacation schedules, if working

J. was paid per trip at the rate of seventy five percent of the line haul income, if working
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k. at his sole discretion and cost, could and did hire others to work for or with him on the

road
I. typically labeled his truck with his name, his company name "Daschund

Transportation" and also the phrase "leased to Western Home Transport"
m. pays the fuel costs, fuel taxes, road taxes, tolls and traffic fines, as encountered from
his own pocket.
n. covers his own truck insurance and travel expense costs, including all motel and meal
expenses.
o. receives a 1099 from Western and pays his own income taxes
p. has the authority to choose his own routes, even for oversized loads, on the rare
occasion when they are not mandated on pre-designated roadways by DOT regulation and the
specific description contained in a state issued trip-permit
q. independently complies with DOT regulations on maximum driving hours, setting his
own start and times and destination points
r. is free to hire out his truck anytime to others, with notice to and leave of Western

s. is paid by funds from Western being transferred into a "Comdata" account, which
funds be accessed by use of a card device
t. has his own DOT and/or Motor Carrier numbers, but uses Western's for their trips
u. bears the risk and has the opportunity to make a profit or a loss on a trip (T 71, 398,11)
A second driver, Michael Byington, was also called at the hearing. His testimony was in
accord with that of Robeson as to his range of independent judgment and action. (T 171, 7- 206,
3

14)
Byington did clarify that he made several errors in understanding and filling out a
questionnaire which had been sent to him. Marked State's Exhibit 10, he wrongly characterized
thereon that the 75% of trip line haul income was a "salary", and acknowledged orally that he too
had received the Form 1099's and simply took them to his accountant. (See Ex-A and See T 181,
1-183, 24 for various confusions related to filling out the DOL form) Byington also more
aggressively markets his personal driving business services to consignors and consignees then
did Robeson. (T196, 5-197, 3 and 198, 13-199,21)
For its part, Western obtains a bill oflading, offers it to a willing driver, requests and
obtains a trip permit and does the necessary office-based, regulatory paperwork, including
interstate fuel tax accounting, thereby relieving the driver of those substantial governmental
compliance burdens. As consistent with and required by federal tax laws, (Ex B,C) Western
treats all its contract drivers as independent entities. Only three of its current operators reside in
Idaho. (T 210,6-9) Nearly all of the "requirements" imposed on such interstate, oversized load
drivers, including those incorporated into the language of the independent contract with Western,
are specifically drawn from United States Department of Transportation laws and regulations.
(hereinafter "DOT") DOT (See Ex, C, D, K, T, U, W, and X and T 213, 1-214, 9, 222, 13-223,
226, 7-230,22)
Because both the DOT and the shippers require various insurance coverages, Western
facilitates the obtaining of both mandatory and optional coverages for the owner operators
through a local broker. (Ex H, I-T 219, 17-220, 11 and T 223, 13-226, 6)
To initiate commerce, Western bids to obtain a bill of lading from a manufacturer who
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wishes to ship an oversize load. (Ex, Z)
If an owner-driver accepts the load, Western will obtain trip permits from all states

through which the "illegal" load will pass. These documents will describe all limiting conditions
imposed by the affected governments for the transit. Those typically include details of routes,
driving hours, flagging and other safety provisions. (See E AA, BB) On his self-determined
schedule, consistent with the contract, the permits and the law, the owner-operator then picks up,
drives and delivers the load, returning the receipt documents to Western for confirmation and
payment. Instead of issuing checks to drivers, Western pays into an electronic clearinghouse
account through an entity called Comdata, which is accessed by the individual drivers using their
own debit cards. (T 220, 16-222, 12) If interstate gas tax reports or other paperwork filings are
required post-trip, Western's office staff does that, further relieving the driver's burdens.
Effecting the Department's self-initiated audit, agent Richard Jones, reported to
Western's premises and interviewed only two people: the company president and its bookkeeper.
He never spoke to a driver. He never inspected a truck and could not remember the exterior
signage of the one truck that he may have seen. From records only, Jones believed that Western
had "about 13" Idaho-based drivers (T 19-19) and that "some of the drivers had their own Motor
Carrier and DOT authorities. (T 18, 17-24) Some had independent business EIN's and some used
"dba's". (T 18, 25 - 19, 8) All drivers received independent contractor Form 1099's from
Western, admitted Jones. (T 50 7-8) Jones never spoke to a manufacturer-consignor. He never
contacted a consignee-purchaser. (T 116, 10-118-20)
Instead, Mr. Jones sent written questioners to "some" drivers. Of those, "some" lesser
number responded. (T 13, 7-9) In fact, the State placed only two such forms in evidence. (E 10,
5

11) One of those forms contained the several mistaken answers as identified above by driver
Byington in his testimony.
On the basis of this evidence, Mr. Jones wrote a seventeen page report reclassifying all
"thirteen" drivers as employees for unemployment taxation purposes for a three year period. (E
3)

Among the unsupported, speculative conclusions reached in the report were these:
1. The Carrier is in effect dictating how the job is to be done (E 3, 8)
2. If the Carrier has the Motor Carrier authority, the Carrier also has the right to control
how, when and where it is use. (Id)
3. No company is going to allow a contractor to choose his own route (E 3, 9)
4. Customers at all times thought they were dealing with the company (E 3, 11)
5. The company controls the routes (Id)
6. The company does dictate the contractors schedule (Id)
7. The contractors do not have their own MC authority (E 3, 12)
8. (The contractors) do not have a business of their own (Id)
9. If the company lost its independent contractors, it would have to hire employees (Id)
10. The work can only be done by an employee (Id)
11. The company pays for insurances on the equipment (E 3, 13)
12. The company advances money in the form of Comdata cards to the contractors (Id)
13. No liability would be incurred by either party upon peremptory termination of the
contract (E 3, 14)
14. Truckers who wish to be independent contractors must obtain their own MC
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authority (Id)
On cross:-:examinationat hearing, Mr. Jones admitted the limitations of his field work,
acknowledged a few over-extended conclusions, defended some inaccuracies, but did not retreat
from his conclusion of "covered employment". Hearing Officer Kime reached the same result
Based upon this reclassification, the Department presented Western with a bill for
$13,277.93, in taxes and penalties. (E 3, 16) Western promptly appealed.
The Industrial Commission then reviewed the matter de novo. Significantly, the
Industrial Commission sided with the employer on both the issue of lack of control and the
existence of an independent profession. In its Decision and Order ( R 22-37) the Commission,
with eleven more precise findings of fact which duly considered the testimony and documents
presented by Western, held that:
1. The drivers are free from Western's control, under the terms of the contract
and in fact, ( R 27), and
2. Eight of the fifteen IDAPA criteria suggest a finding that Western's driver's
are independent contractors, that
3. Three of the criteria are neutral, although
4. Three sets of facts argue that Western's drivers are employees, and
5. "Although there is significant evidence to suggest that the owner/operators in
this case are independent contractors", per the Giltner decision, "as a matter of
law, the owner/operators are employees", and
6. "As unreasonable as it may be, particularly to Employer in this case, it is the
Court's majority ruling, ... that is binding on this tribunal as a matter oflaw" R
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35.
In summary,the Commission would have decided in favor of Western and against the
Department, but for Giltner' s "per se" rule of law.
Upon that decision, W estem appealed to this Court.

IL
ISSUES ON APPEAL
This matter presents the following questions for the Court:
A. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRECEDENT OF THE
GILTNER CASE AS CONTROLLING TO THE FACTS HEREIN?
B. WHETHER THE FACTS HEREIN AND CASES FROM IDAHO AND ELSEWHERE
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GILTNER RULE IS WRONGLY DECIDED?
C. WHETHER INDEPENDENT TRUCKERS CAN OPERATE USING A COLLECTIVE
SALES, DATA AND DISBURSEMENT OFFICE WITHOUT BECOMING EMPLOYEES
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT TAX PURPOSES?
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review over legal
conclusions, but will not set aside any findings of fact which are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 9, Excell Construction, Inc., v State
Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). The substantial and
competence evidence standard is met if facts are such that a reasonable mind might accept them
in support of the offered conclusion. Uhl v. Ballard Metal Products, 138 Idaho 653 67 P 3d 1265
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(2003) However, when erroneous evidence is considered, particularly when a factual issue is
closely contested, a case should be remanded to the

factfind~r

for reconsigeratignofrel~vagt

issues without the errors. Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 681, 905 P2d 82 (Idaho
App 1995). Conclusions of fact which are clearly erroneous should and will be disturbed by this
Court. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P3d 1238 (2002). The uncontradicted
testimony of credible witnesses, unless inherently improbable or rendered so by other facts at the
hearing, must be accepted as true on the record. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-7, 603
P2d 575, 581-2 (1979). If the Industrial Commission failed to make a proper application oflaw
to the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court must set aside the erroneous conclusions.
Blayneyv. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986)
IV.
THE PRECEDENT OF GILTNER
Giltner v. Idaho Department of Commerce, supra was decided by this Court in February
of 2009. The facts therein were quite similar to those of Western. Based in Jerome, Giltner,_ Inc.,
engaged drivers to deliver hauled goods, paying them a percentage of the contract receipts
earned. Unlike Western, Giltner had a mixed pool of drivers. Some were characterized by the
company as employees and some as independent contractors. Of the latter, some utilized their
own DOT authority and some used Giltner's. Upon reclassification of the latter group only,
Giltner appealed. With Justice Burdick writing for the majority, three important and relevant
herein holdings were issued:
1. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN USING ADHERENCE TO FEDERAL LAW
AND REGULATIONS AS EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER CONTROL.

9

Reaffirming a line of authority which has now existed for over half a century, this Court
reminded the labor authorities that federal and regulatory mandates are not evidence of
employment.
2. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF "OTHER
SUFFICIENT" EVIDENCE OF CONTROL OVER TYPICALLY INDEPENDENT
TRUCKERS.
"Furthermore there was insufficient evidence otherwise demonstrating control," this
Court held at 145 Idaho 420.
3. ANY TRUCKER SOLELY DEPENDENT ON AND USING ANOTHER'S DOT
AUTHORITY COULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BE ENGAGED IN AN
INDEPENDENT TRADE.
It is solely this third holding that the Commission used to reclassify Westem's drivers.

The Record herein is to proposed as a basis to give this Court a more concise understanding of
how these national authorities are mandated and for what public purpose they are specified. The
Appellant urges that this portion of the Giltner holding, on these facts, is not warranted and is
inconsistent with and unsupportable under other case decisions by this Court and other states. As
to this proposition, Giltner and the Commission's finding based thereon should be reversed.

v.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE WESTERN DRIVERS ARE FACTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THOSE IN

NATIONAL TRAILER CONVOY,

WHOM THIS

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.
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COURT FOUND TO BE

A nearly identical employment security contribution case was considered by this Court in
NationalTrailerConvoy,Incv.§mpl()XffiE:11t§ecufityj\gt;:ncyofidaho,83Idaho247,360P2d994
(1961 ). Like Western, National contracted with drivers to deliver oversized manufactured homes
across state lines. It had a Boise operations terminal, as does Western. Both used a written contract
to engage an independent agent to use their privately owned tractor-trucks to haul the loads for
compensation on a mileage basis. Payment is to covers both the owner-operator's services and the
use of the truck. The pertinent facts found in the agency hearing in National were these:
The agreement between the corporation and the individual owner-operators
is set forth in a written contract. The operator owns and insures his truck.
He may hire competent drivers to operate the equipment. When other
drivers are hired, the owner-operator must pay all applicable
Workmen's Compensation and employer's liability insurance. However,
nearly all of the operators with whom we are concerned own only one
truck each and drive the trucks themselves. This is the present practice
of the corporation. The truck must conform to the standards of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The owner provides all insurance
except on the cargo. All maintenance expenses, including gasoline, oil,
tires, and repairs, are paid by the owner of the vehicle.
The company maintains a bulletin board at each terminal listing the
operators who are available. A haul is offered first to the driver at the
top of the list; ifhe declines, his name may be dropped to the bottom of
the list.
When an operator accepts a haul, he chooses his own route and arrival time.
After he has delivered a trailer, he may at his discretion return home, report
to another company terminal for service, or attend to personal affairs.
An operator may transfer from one terminal to another at his discretion.
He reports at his convenience. Operators sometimes will not report for two
or three weeks. One operator did not report for two months; the relationship
was then terminated by mutual agreement.
The owner may use his truck for other purposes as long as such uses do not
compete with National Trailer Convoy. However, the vehicles are designed
to haul trailers. Some operators use their trucks as second passenger cars.
The company carries insurance on cargo in transit. In case of loss, the
operator indemnifies the company for the first $100. If subsequent
investigation by the company shows the driver was not at fault, he
is reimbursed. The company requires that the operator carry a policy with
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a $2,000 medical provision for his own protection. Maximum hours for
drivers are set by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Operators must
conform with these andothersafetyrequirementsoftheLC.C, They rnust
make trip reports, and have their trucks checked every 30 days. The
company maintains road patrols which may rule a driver off the road if his
driving is not satisfactory. The agreement may be terminated by either
party. However, if the operator terminates before he has made 25 trips, he
forfeits a $50 indemnity.
Compensation for each trailer movement is based on mileage and the
weight and size of the trailer. The operator knows before he accepts a
haul what the compensation will be. The operator determines where his
truck shall be kept. He chooses his own routes and the stopping places en
route.
The operator may be required to collect for the haul.
Each truck carries a permanent decal identifying it as a National Trailer
Convoy vehicle, in conformance with regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Id at 83 Idaho 250-251

Each of the facts cited by the Supreme Court as "pertinent" above is identical or similar to
those in the Western record. Applying the then applicable 'common-law rules" for determining the
definition of a covered employee, this Court found an absence of employer control over the method,
plan and details of the work, despite the use of a common ICC permit. It held the drivers to be
independent contractors.
The Court particularly focused on a four point test which it concluded marks of the existence
of an independent contractor relationship: ( 1) The right to hire subordinates, (2) the ownership of
the major items of equipment, (3) that contract termination may incur liability and (4) payment for
a result or by the job.
In National, then, as in Wes tern, now, the independent truckers used the Interstate Commerce
Commission (now DOT) license of the carrier. This was neither significant, nor commented upon
by the Supreme Court in 1961 when determining covered employment. Instead the Court then held:

12

Requirements that truck and driver meet Interstate Commerce
Commission standards, and existence of the road patrols, point
toward compliance with governmental regulations, and are
not indicia of an employer-employee relationship. The drivers'
control of his route, of the garaging and upkeep of his truck, his
privilege of refusing a haul, all indicate the status of an independent
contractor. Id at 83 Idaho 252.

That holding in Western was also the genesis of the rule reiterated forty seven years later in
the first holding of Giltner, that federal regulatory requirements are not badges of employer control.
B. LIKEWISE THE WESTERN DRIVERS ARE AS INDEPENDENT AS THOSE FOUND

IN HAMMOND V. DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT.
By 1971, the Idaho Legislature had abrogated the common-law employment test and adopted
a statutory provision exempting from covered employment only individuals "engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession of business" and who were "free from
control or direction in the performance ofhis work". (Then codified as Idaho Code Section 72-1316
(1 l)(d); now it is Section 72-1316 (4)) Under that modem standard, this Court considered the
circumstances of two moving company truckers in Hammond v. Dept of Employment, 94 Idaho 66,
480 P 2d 912 (1971). The drivers owned their own trucks and transported household goods
nationwide using franchiser Allied Van Lines' Interstate Commerce Commission permits.
Again, many of the Hammond facts closely parallel the circumstances ofWestem's drivers
in the instant case:
During 1968, Coulter and Frei each purchased their own truck tractor
and became long-haul operators, transporting household goods from
one point in the United States to another. Though both men make their
homes in the Lewiston-Moscow area and get home when they can,
less then ten percent of the shipments they handle originate or terminate
in this area. The truck tractors were purchased independently of Hammond
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and the latter is in no way responsible for payments on the balance of the
purchase contracts. The two drivers are responsible for all maintenance
and
of their
maintain their own insurancepoliciesthereon,
and may use the vehicles for their own personal use.
All orders as to where a load is to be picked up and delivered come from
Allied rather than from Hammond. Hammond may request through Allied
that a driver pick up a particular load but the driver may reject such request,
and is under no contractual obligation to accept any load. Though Allied
does the actual scheduling, the drivers are free to pick the route they wish
in getting from the point of origin to their destination. The drivers arrange
their own time off whenever they wish to do so. They are responsible for
the loading and unloading of the trailers which is not controlled or
supervised by Hammond in any way. They purchase their own packing
materials, hire assistants to aid them in loading and unloading the trailers,
and pay for all expenses associated with such activities.
Hammond has an Idaho PUC permit but no ICC permit. All shipments
handled by Coulter and Frei are under the authority of Allied's ICC and
Idaho PCU permits. Both drivers are subject to ICC rules and regulations
regarding maximum driving hours, trip reports, and equipment safety checks.
Both are licensed by Allied and must meet physical and other
requirements established by Allied and the ICC. Transportation rates are
set by Allied subject to ICC approval and the drivers are paid on a pershipment basis. Allied sends the money to Hammond who pays over to
the drivers their share and retains an amount as rental for the use of
his vans. The driver received 52% of the total charge made to the
customer for loading, transportation and unloading. If the customer
requests additional services, the driver retains 100% of the charge
therefor. Each driver is totally responsible for damage to cargo while in
his control and claims are deduced from payments due them.
No federal of state income tax is withheld from payments to Coulter and
Frei nor are deductions made for social security and similar items. They
receive no vacation to bonus as do employees of Hammond, nor do they
have access to Hammond warehouse facilities as do Hammond employees.
They do not complete Hammond Company employee forms and both do
their own bookkeeping. They pay for their own expenses on their hauls,
and copies of their records, including itemization of expenses, are not
required nor received by Hammond.
Coulter and Frei both attended a school operated by Allied to train them in
the skills of moving and driving, and both are licensed by Allied. They
apparently have no contract with Allied, however, and haul only on Hammond
trailers through Hammond's agency agreement with Allied. Should they
leave Allied, their services and equipment could be employed by another
moving company. Both Coulter and Frei consider themselves self-employed
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and do not wish to be included under employment security coverage.
Id. at 94 Idaho 67

Upon these facts, the Department of Employment held the drivers to be employees, not
independent contractors. However, the Industrial Accident Board disagreed with the Department,
rejecting its finding of coverage. It held instead that the "record fully shows that Coulter and Frei
were free from control or direction" and met a three point independent business test by having the
authority to hire subordinates and owing their equipment, especially where they experienced unreimbursed expenses.
Here again in Hammond, this Court has found independent truck drivers to be contractors,
not employees, even while using a third party's ICC authority to take interstate trips, if enough
freedom from control is present. Why then does Giltner hold to the contrary?
C. THE FIRST HOLDING IN GLITNER PROPERLY REAFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE THAT
ADHERENCE TO FEDERAL INTERSTATE TRUCKING LAW OR REGULATION CAN NOT
BE EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER CONTROL OVER A LONG HAUL TRUCKER
As noted above, beginning in 1961 with the National precedent, this Court has recognized
that the practice of incorporating federal regulatory requirements in contract language and course of
dealing practices between a haul company and its solo drivers is neither evidence of private
enterprise control nor destructive of individual independence. National, supra; Hammond, supra.
The same holding was issued again in Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 175 P
3d 199 (2007) However, it was in the different context of a workers compensation claim case.
In Hernandez, this Court specifically cited and summarized the content of several U.S. Code
Title 49, Section 376 Code of Federal Regulation provisions dealing with mandated insurance and
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decal labeling of the truck doors. It reminded that federal law too precludes the use of these factors
as an employment altering test, quoting Title 49, Section CFR 376. 12 9 (c)(4) which clarifies that
nothing therein "is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor is an
independent contractor or employee of the authorized carrier lessee." Id at 145 Idaho 41
Thus, the principle of regulatory provision non-usage in unemployment determinations
remains good law in Idaho, per Giltner and the other precedents cited. The Appellant suggests that
a DOT license is merely another federal regulatory requirement which should determine nothing
about "covered employment" for unemployment tax purposes.
D. THE THIRD HOLDING GILTNER IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS DEFINING
EMPLOYMENT ANNOUNCED IN EARLIER IDAHO CASES WHICH WERE NOT
OVERRULED, CREATING CONFUSION
As noted above, this Court has three times ignored the use of another's DOT authority
interstate commerce when deciding control and independence issues for employment-type tax
purposes. National, Hammond, and Hernandez were all decided prior to Giltner. Although
Hammond was not mentioned in the majority decision, National and Hernandez were favorably
cited as to the federal regulation holding and were neither overruled nor distinguished for the other
"per se" proposition that operation under another's DOT authority eliminates the independence of
a trade. In fact, no law, case or regulation is cited for this proposition by the majority in Giltner.
By contrast Mr. Justice Jones in his dissent, points out that National and Hammond are nearly
identical trucking cases which reach an opposite result from the Giltner court. This absence of
clarity, requires action by this Court to restore predictability for the Department, the Commission
and the affected private parties and industries. This Court should overule Giltner or distinguish the
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other cases to avoid the current confusion.
E.

THE THIRD HOLDING IN GILTNER IS WRONGLY DECIDED AND SHOULD BE

REVISED OR REVERSED: THE USE OF ANOTHER'S DOT AUTHORITY DOES NOT
DESTROY THE INDEPENDENCE OF AN ESTABLISHED, FREE-STANDING OCCUPATION
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Essentially, the use of a third party's DOT authority in interstate commerce is nothing more
than another form of compliance with federal regulation which, as this record shows does, not alter
the habits, spirit and independence of the truck driving profession. Instead, as practiced by Western,
the centralized DOT authority usage extended to a community of self-reliant owner/operators, merely
provides the dual convenience of more effective marketing and relief from the oppressive burdens
of obtaining, maintaining and submitting regulatory-compliance paperwork.
In the hearing transcript, an overview is found which gives some particularity and removes
some of the mystery about this overarching federal license requirement through the testimony of Mr.
Jones, the Department's field investigator:
Q. And so what are the specific requirements for the transport of goods
across state lines by a trucking company? A. Well, in order to
transport nonexempt goods across state lines a trucking company has to
obtain an MC number, which is a Motor Carrier number, and that's an
authority that's issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
and the Motor Carrier number is what constitutes the authority to cross state
lines or hire as a motor carrier and all companies transporting freight for
hire are required to obtain a Motor Carrier number. The Motor Carrier
Act was enacted, basically, to promote safety upon conservative use
of public highways and provide for the supervision, regulation and control
of the use of such highways by all motor vehicles and was created to
protect the clients and the carriers. Each motor carrier also must obtain a
US-DOT number. A U.S. Department of Transportation number issued by
the United States Department of Transportation. This number is the main
tracking number for a motor carrier company. The US-DOT number
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registers the number issued by the United States Department of Transportation.
This number is the main tracking number for a motor carrier company. The
US-DOT number registers the number of trucks, drivers, and the safety rating
of a motor carrier company, but a US-DOT number does not constitute
authority, it's the MC number. The Motor Carrier number. Also each motor
carrier company must have what they call VOC-3 process agents. Process
agents are people designated in each state that can accept legal documents on
behalf of the motor carrier company ...
Q. Is a carrier required to obtain liability and cargo insurance? A. Yes, they are.
They are required to have the liability and cargo insurance that must be
furnished by the carrier and - do you want me to continue on in answering
another question that they - - as far as their specific requirements to
transport goods across state lines?
Q. I will just ask you some specific questions. A. Okay. All right Q. Do
you know anything about the Unified Carrier Registration Act? A. Yes.
That's an agreement that is for all states and that all motor carriers, both
exempt as well as regulated, have to participate in that. They are subject to
fees under the Unified Carrier Registration Act and they are - the fees are
calculated on a company based on the number of commercial vehicles that it
has- that it operates. Q. And must a carrier-are they required to obtain a
fuel tax license? A. Yes. With the International Fuel Tax Act agreernentagreernent all carriers have to have the - be registered with IFTA, the
International Fuel Tax Act, and they must report their miles and fuel
usage and purchase in each state where ever they stop and their routes
have to be recorded- there exact routes have to be recorded so that the fuel
tax could be divided up and proportioned to the states in which they travel,
according to the miles they travel. Q. Okay. Now, who must have DOT
and MC numbers? A. Anybody who is doing transportation across state
lines - carrying goods across state line has to have- they have to have their
MC, their Motor Carrier authority, and their US-DOT numbers. Q. And is
there an exhibit that provides that if-federal law? A. Yes, Exhibit 29
basically states that they have to be registered and that federal law is
USCA-13-901and13-902. Q. Okay. Would that be Title 49?
Transportation? A. Yes, it is. Q. Okay. Do any of these drivers have
or-drive using their own MC, DOT authority? A. There are some in the
company that-some of the people that were reclassified that had their
own MC authority, yes. Q. And did they drive using that MC authority?
A. They had to drive under the authority of the MC authority of
Western Home Transport. Q. And did some of the drivers have
businesses with their own federal EIN or Department of Employment?
A. Yes. Some of them had their own EIN numbers, othersEDS Transport, Dachshund Transport, Happy Hornes, LLC. All of those
had their own federal EIN and Department of Employment numbers.
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Q. And did some of the drivers have dba's'? A. Yes. Some of them had dba's.
Chad McMicael. David Byington. TP Hart trucking.
(f 13, 16-14,16 and 16, 25 19,8)
M

This exchange confirms that the Motor Carrier authority an.d DOT registrations are nothing
more, and nothing less, than federal regulatory burdens. Whether imposed on or lifted from a
truckdriver's own shoulders, licensing does not change the essence of overland driving. Such
centralized licensing is a convenience both to the national government, which ha.s fewer licenses to

issue and monitor and to the. trucker, who maintains duties of the local, individual and corporate
licenses and permissions only. Likewise, state road permitting and tax compliance is centralized in

Western's office without destroying any highway independence or asserting any employermlike
control. The workplace remains a truck cab, the job site a roadway and the result a safely, property~
regulated, delivered load.
The record contains an analogy that also may be useful to the Court. Not all centralized
trucking offices are deemed "employers" even under the current Giltn.ercriteria, concedes Mr. Jones
for the Department:

Q. I like that phrase trucking brokerage. What is a trucking brokerage;
sir, in your mind? A. A trucking brokerage is a company that obtains
loads for other motor carriers and the implication is that loads for other
motor carriers have the authority- the MC authority. Q. Okay.
If a trucking brokerage would do exactly what Western Homes does,
setting aside the issue for a moment of- of MC authority, DOT licensing,
a trucking brokerage would obtain contracts or opportunities for loads, bills
of lading, would spin those to an independent contractor and, then, wouldwould also do the paperwork associated with the delivery of that load; am
I COITect? A. A trucking brokerage would get a load for a motor carrier,
who is a licensed motor carrier. Q. Right. And the trucking brokerage
would, basically, act as support for that carrier in obtaining loads
and doing compliance paperwork. A. Well, once that load is given from the
trucking brokerage to the motor carrier, the motor carrier and the
client become connected up and that is the -everything goes through it
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that way. Q. So, you're not using trucking brokerage as to anybody but
a finder of contracts? A. That is correct. Q. Okay. A. A trucking
brokerage can have his own motor carrier as well, but-but in this particular
case with Western Horne Transport, they do not have a trucking brokerage
license. Q. Okay. Does that require a specific DOT license? A. It's a separate
license, yes.
If a trucking brokerage, under separate DOT licensing, can provide fundamentally the same

services as Western for independent-contracting drivers, what compels a different finding when we
do exactly the same tasks to find loads and do compliance paperwork? There is simply no factual
or legal basis, no public purpose served and no federal requirement which compels the Giltner third
holding.
F. COMMUNITY USE OF A CENTRAL SCHEDULER'S MC/DOT AUTHORITY IS MERELY
A CONVENIENT METHOD OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL INTERSTATE TRUCKING
LAW AND REGULATION, NOT EMPLOYMENT
In fact, the truck brokerage model represents one of the only methods by which the
independence of a small trucker can be preserved. As discussed at hearing, the significant burdens
of road-rule compliance when driving an oversized load on state permit specified routes, with or
without other-compelled safety equipment, during lawful times, for no more than maximum periods,
ending at compliant parking spots while keeping up-to-date in cab logs is plenty of work for an
unsophisticated driver. Contracting for a centralized office function, is not only smart; it is
necessary. As the Industrial Commission concedes, this record is quite clear in disclosing that
neither self-control nor driver independence are forfeited thereby.
G. THE FACTS ON THIS RECORD SHOW THAT WESTERN'S CONTRACT TRUCKERS
RETAINED AND EXERCISED TRADITIONAL "OPEN ROAD" INDEPENDENCE
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Both truckers who testified herein, Daniel Robeson and Michael Byington, were adamant
about their independent status. " I make a decision whether I work or don't work, where I stop and
where I buy fuel, all that stuff. My decision", said Robeson (T74, 17-19)
Q. Do you regard yourself as an independent contractor or an employee
of Western? A. I'm an independent contractor of-Western just helps me
out, I guess. I don't know. They just, you know, pay me and-they help find
my loads and stuff. Q. You regard yourself as an independent contractor?
A. Well, of course. I always have really.
Q. Does the company control you when your're on the road sir? A. No.
Sometimes I will ask for-see what the weather is. Sometimes I will call in,
because I'm computer illiterate, and they will tell me what the wind
conditions are, because I have been blowed over before and it kind of scares
me. Q. Who determines when you start in the morning? A. I do. Q. Who
detennines when you eat during the day? A. I do. Well, my stomach.
Q And who determines when and where you fuel? A. I do.
So testified Byington. (T 180, 14-20 and 179, 7-19)
Neither of these witnesses was a poet or philosopher. Both were asked mostly technical
questions, so relatively little testimony in the record captures that vaunted "spirit of the open road"
or the reputed "independence" of thought and act often attributed to long-haul truckers. However,
Mr. Byington comes pretty close to both in explaining the necessity for an operation like Western' s
and his own sense of right and entitlement in the following exchanges on cross-examination:
A. As a matter of fact, I tell the dealers- I says, hey, you know-, since
I do such a good job, why don't you use me. I will tell them and dealer
will tum around and tell W estem, yeah, well, we want this person to haul
these loads only. We don't want any other drivers, because this guy does a
good job. Q. So, they don't come directly to you-to hire you, they go
through Western? A. I-well, they don't- the dealers don't come to me. I've
had them call me, yes. They have before. Q. and what do you tell them
when they call you? A. Oh, what I do is just tell me as I go-I will say, oh,
hook up with Western and, then, they will set me up with a freight bill,
because we can't go nowhere without a freight bill. Q. Can you- A. They
will make me up a freight bill, so I'm legal, you know, because I-like I
say, I'm computer illiterate, I don't know how to do that stuff. And, then,
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they-then they figure out the pay on it, because I can't do that either.
Q. Who is they? Is that Western figuring that out? A. Yeah. they- yeah,
they-they help figure out stuff like that. That's what we pay them for is to
help us. (T 191, 1-24)
Then he is asked:
Q. So, if you weren't working under Western you had to find-would you be
ab le to operate on your own? A. Yeah. If I go through all that for my own
authority and get my licensing and all that stuff and I don't know how to
do that either, so- Q. Right now without your own authority and license or
whatever it is that you're saying you need, could you operate on your own
without Western? A. Well, ifl'd get a secretary I probably could and a littleprobably a lot more money to get going I probably could. Q. Okay. And so
we were talking about your own authority. That's the MC authority-DOT
authority; is that correct? A. Yeah. All that stuff. Yeah. I don't-year.
It's just too-it's just too much for me. I couldn't handle it. (T 193, 9-25)
And finally, Byington concludes:

Q. What name is on the truck? A. What name? Q. Yeah. A. I could put my
name on it if I wanted to. Q What name is on the truck? A. Western
Horne Transport. Q. Okay. Is your name anywhere on that truck? A. I don't
want my name on the truck. I could put my name- I could- I could do graffiti
all over that truck, I could put my name on it, I can do anything I want to
that truck, as long as it don't, you know, cause too much attraction and get
me in trouble, you know, sort of, you know, having murals of naked women
on there, I don't know. Q. Ms. George: I don't have any further questions.
Thank you. (T 194, 11-25)
The spirit of the open road of doing "anything I want to that truck" and the existence of the
computer skills necessary to timely file complicated regulatory paperwork must co-exist in modem
day America.

In fact, the centralized office services of Western create greater, not lesser,

independence for the truckers using this system. Western permits its drivers to be "gentlemen of the
road," not scrivners. For that reason too, the Giltner holding does not pass scrutiny.
H. OTHER STATES HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT A GILTNER-TYPE HOLDING IS WRONG
The Industrial Commission alleged in its decision that other state courts have reached the
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same conclusion that use of another's DOT authority compels a finding of covered employment for
unemployment tax purposes. ( R 31) However, it cited only Meri ck Trucking Inc., v. Missouri Dept
of Labor and Industrial Relations, 933 S. W. 2d 938 (1996).

Therein, a Western district,

intermediate appellate court for Missouri held upon a record oftypical facts, including contract lease
language, truck door decals and expense payments, that an "employee" designation would be
sustained. However, the facts are anything but typical of Western's arrangement. In Merick, the
company owned the truck, maintained the rigs, paid for the fuel, covered all insurance and put its
own name therefore, on the cabs. Merick bore all risk of loss or damage and merely leased an
individual truck to each driver. A single sentence makes a reference in passing to federal licensure:
"The referee also noted that, as a practical matter, the drivers were entirely
dependent on Merick's favor because Merick held the ICC license, Merick
handled the billings, Merick could terminate the relationship at any time,
and there was no evidence that the drivers ever drove for any other
trucking firm."
Thus, the case does not state, contrary to the Commission suggestion, that a DOT (or ICC)
license was held, or should be held to be legally determinative.
Perhaps this Court agrees, as it did not cite Merick as parallel authority from a sister state in
its 2008 decision. In fact, it did not cite any case or any reason for its holding in Giltner.
Interestingly, neither party before the Court in Giltner, through their briefing, even discussed the
issue of a DOT authority being dispositive of the contest. Thus, no such cases were briefed before
this case announced its rule.
Although cited four times by Missouri courts in labor cases since 1996, Merick has never
been used in any reported case as authority for a Giltner-type rule, Westlaw research suggests. As
far as can be determined, only Idaho has the Giltner rule, which even here, conflicts with earlier
23

decided Idaho cases.
There are instances, however, where other courts reviewing facts like Westem's have not
seized upon the federal licensing status as determinative. For a period of time, the law in North
Carolina was likewise unclear, after the Supreme Court held in Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652,
118 SE 2d 5 ( 1961) that an injured trucker for workers compensation law purposes, even ifhe would
otherwise be found independent and beyond control of the lessee of his truck, must be deemed an
"employee", if he operated under a lessee's ICC interstate authority. However, that rule has been
rejected in Reco Transportation, Inc v. Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, 81
N.C. App 415, 344 S.E. 2d 294 (1986) Therein, the Court of Appeals declined to extend that per se
"workers comp" rule to unemployment compensation cases. This holding is directly in point. The
ESC conceded that the Reco owner/operators were independent contractors at common-law. Solely
on the basis of the Interstate Commerce Authority rule of Watkins for injury cases, the ESC asked
the Court of Appeals to create a similar holding that cross-border drivers without their own federal
licensing must be deemed "employees" as to unemployment taxes. The three judges unanimously
refused to do so. Instead, they applied the traditional North Carolina test for determining employer
control and the existence of an independent business, just as this Court should. Noting that nothing
about trucker independence was precluded by the use of the Lessee's ICC license for interstate
driving, the Court held:
"In the absence of any discernible public policy or rule of common law,
which motivated our Supreme Court to carve out an exception to the
general rule for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act as set forth
in Hennis, supra, we decline to further extend the exception stated therein.
We hold that the evidence does not support the findings made by the ESC
and the findings made thereby are insufficient to support the ESC's
conclusions that the drivers in question are employees of RECO for
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purposes of (unemployment insurance) Id at 344 S.E. 2d 297
(citations omitted)
A recent Washington case also emphasizes that ICC authority is merely one other factor a
court might consider in determining employment, or not, on statutory criteria.

In Penick v.

Employment Security Department, 82 Wash App 30, 917 P 2d 136 (1996) the Court of Appeals of
Washington sustained an administrative finding of employee status for truckers who drove wood
shakes across the Northwest to Northern California using the truck owner's ICC authority. In
applying a three prong statutory test, the Court did not comment on the centralized ICC authority
whatsoever.
To the same effect, although the facts are not as fully developed, the Court of Appeals of
New York, in Lafayette Storage and Moving v. Hartnett, 77 NY 2d 823, 566 N.Y S. 2d 198 (1991)
remanded a case for further proceedings which involved interstate Atlas Van Lines drivers without
adopting a per se rule. Instead, the appellate court simply wanted more evidence on the independent
contract status of certain employees.
Likewise, Wisconsin cheese haulers who deliver "outbound loads", apparently interstate,
were held to be independent owner operators and not employees. The Court of Appeals made no
mention of DOT/ICC licensing and applied typical control and independence test instead. Wisconsin
Cheese Service, Inc. v. Dept. oflndustry, Labor and Human Relations, 115 Wis 2 d 573, 340 N-W
2 d 908 (1983) An earlier Wisconsin case reaches the same result. See Star Line Trucking v.
Department oflndustry, Labor and Human Relations, 109 Wis 2d 266, 325 NW 2d 872 (1982) (the
dissent of Justice Abrahamson at 325 NW 2d 882 mentions that the independent contractors can
operate under a single ICC certificate)
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Although not involving a national license, a Southwestern case sets up an analogous statelevel situation. Smith v. Arizona Dept of Economic Security 128 AZ 21, 123 P 2d 810 (1980)
involved a central office which contracted with truckers to move and set up mobile homes within
that state's boundaries. Only the Smiths possessed the Arizona certificate of convenience and
necessity- their contract lease drivers did not. The truckers operated under that single license without
obtaining their own. The same managerial services and booking functions done here by Western
were performed at the Smith offices. The Arizona Court of Appeals simply performed the typical
statutory control review in that case and found no employer-employee relationship in the absence
of control. In other words, the possession and use of a state authority collectively was not a "per se
event."
Finally, under yet another context, the United States District Court for Idaho recently opined
on the effect of an "employer's" DOT authority on its "employees". It is factually and legally
dissimilar to our situation, but contains dicta worthy of reflection. In Shoemaker v. United Parcel
Service, 2011WL836998, an employee was classified as exempt from overtime pay under the Fair
Labor Standards Act by UPS. When the employee complained, UPS contended that it set delivery
standards in accord with U.S. Department of Transportation requirements. As a salaried, on-road
supervisor, Shoemaker, :frequently working more than 40 hours a week, felt that he should get
overtime pay. However, under the Federal Motor Carrier Act Exemption, ifhe was acting as a driver
covered by that Act, no overtime would be awarded. In reasoning to a conclusion on this question,
Federal Magistrate Candy W. Dale notes:
"For a motor carrier to fall within the DOT's jurisdiction, it must transport
passengers or property in interstate commerce ... However, simply
because an employer might fall under the DOT's authority, not all of its
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employees will fall under the DOT's authority by virtue of their
employment" (citations omitted).
While of no precedential or even logical value, those two sentences do well express the
concept that the delink:ing of the mere existence of DOT Ii censure from unintended consequences
should be contemplated in employment cases. Simply because Giltner and Western agreed to
assume umbrella DOT licensure responsibility should not affect either their employees or their
independent contractors. The existence of such a license should not define, at law, anything more
than the duties of the license holder to the DOT. Giltner, Holding Three, is wrongly decided.
VI.

REQUEST FOR FEES AND COSTS
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Western requests this Court to award its attorneys fees
and costs incurred on appeal.
VII

CONCLUSION
For each all of the above-urged reasons, the Appellant asks this Honorable Court to reverse
the holding below, to declare the truckers associated with Western to be independently employed,
no tax due and, if necessary, remand this matter to the Industrial Commission for further consistent
proceedings.
DATED This

day of May, 2013.
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David H. Leroy, Attorney for he Appellant
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